[Ferdinard Alquié]: And yet, what struck me is that all the examples which he gave were not properly philosophical examples. He spoke to us about the straight line, which is a mathematical example, about the egg, which is a physiological example, about genes, which is a biological example. When he came to the truth, I said to myself: finally, here is a philosophical example! But this example quickly turned bad, for Deleuze said to us that we had to ask ourselves: who wants the truth? why does one want the truth?
[Gilles Deleuze]: Your other reproach touches me still more. For I believe completely in the specificity of philosophy, and this conviction is one I receive from you yourself. You say, however, that the method that I describe borrows its applications from all over the place, from different sciences, but very little from philosophy. And that the only philosophical example that I brought up, that of truth, turned bad rather, since it consisted in dissolving the concept of truth into psychological or psychoanalytical determinations. If this is the case, it is a failure. For the Idea, as virtual-real, must not be described in terms which are solely scientific, even if science necessarily intervenes in its process of actualisation. Even concepts like singular and regular, remarkable and ordinary, are not exhausted by mathematics. (1)
This was 1967, a year in which Gilles Deleuze was reproached by his professors for turning philosophy into a “mere expository tool in the service of science.” Times have indeed changed, even if the “form of change” has not changed. (Kant’s vengeance?) Nowadays, the absolute has been resurrected under a new guise. A “primary absolute,” the new “great outdoors.” New axioms and new truths, a “purer” relation with science at the expense of so many badly stated problems and presuppositions in the name of thought. A new philosophy of science restored by right in the wake of Kant’s great transcendental error.
Of course, Deleuze was employing a metaphysical conceptualization of science based on what would later be called problematics: an ontological (and hence epistemological) approach grounded, or, better yet, “groundlessly grounded”, on the notion of Spinozist Univocity. For Deleuze any dualism of subject and object can only ever be a “poor approximation of thought.” Problematics are grounded on an ontology of multiplicity and events. This in stark contrast to axiomatics, which eliminates the event from ontology in favor of rigorous conceptual formalizations of being. Concept vs function: both make claim to the being of pure mathematics. Deleuze’s allegiance was no doubt with the former, and we have returned, full force, to times of the latter.
Our axiomatic times demand realism. Our states of affairs are crossed by lines of war, debt, financial crisis, abstract monetary machines, the financialization of the earth and socius, digital atomization. Not unlike the turbulent times which set the terms for the emergence of rationalism in the 17th century. Times of relative deterritorialization for the extraction of capital, in which thought has become coextensive with the event of the media. A collapse of the world grounded in human reason, a world which will need to be reconstructed, yet on different grounds (hence the neo-baroque): the cogito taken to the nth power.
In other words, the institution of a new image of thought, inseparable from a new variation of the concept of error. A new timbre, or tonality: Correlationism. The anti-correlationist image of thought claims by right what is proper to thought, grounded on a new form of doubt. A new critical method, pregnant with its analogical primaries and secondaries, a new means of judgement with the goal to radicalize further the subject-object divide: the anti-correlationist seeks the real object-in-itself as opposed to the object-for-us. Thought, in so far as it is correlationist, will be an obstacle to overcome for the anti-correlationist is his quest for the absolute beyond thought. The non-correlationist’s task is therefore clear, as it is meant “first and foremost to restore realist philosophy after the phenomenological, linguistic and epistemological developments in continental thought.”(2)
Much as was the case with Descartes, over four centuries ago: the first decision of thought, its first orientation, comes from a definition of error: “the thesis of the essential inseparability of the act of thinking from its content. All we ever engage with is what is given-to-thought, never an entity subsisting by itself.” (3) The dogmatism instituted by Kant must be overcome qua the necessary and contingent absolute beyond thought.
Yet the noologist (pleasant psycho-social type) tells us that we are still dealing with a dogmatic image of thought with a host of pre-philosophical presuppositions. And quite possibly reactionary at that, given that turbulent times often demand a reconstruction of thought, however different the historical grounds may seems to be. As error is granted full immanence in the non-correlationist image of thought, we’d like to take the perspective of the noologist in order to better understand what the non-correlationist image of thought grants immanence “to.” So as to better grasp the pre-philosophical axes, vectors, decisions, orientations and speeds that belong to the non-correlationist by right. Its Apeiron, absolute horizon. A geological approach.
The non-correlationist grants a privileged status to René Descartes, one of the first metaphysicians to have discovered the “Great Outdoors” in the midst of the Galileo-Copernican scientific event. Before the great “turning away” of Kant. Descartes not only discovers the absolute, or the grounds for the object-in-itself, but discovers, by right, that it can be known, or at least “translatable” to thought itself. And that the sensible must be rejected. Discoveries stemming from the attribution of error and the qualified cogito.
Being that After Finitude, a seminal work in the advancement of non-correlationist thought proposes the Cartesian revolution as a model to follow, the noologist will take the opportunity to examine in greater detail the Cartesian image of thought, in order ot better understand what the non-correlationist image of thought grounds itself on. The noologist won’t be discouraged by claims in After Finitude such as: “there is no need to examine Descartes’ proof, since the nub of the (correlationist) refutation pertains to the pretension to be able to think the absolute, rather than to any of the details deployed to that end.” (4) The noologist won’t heed the warning, in other words, and will indeed proceed to examine Descartes’ proof, so as to better appraise its fundamental presuppositions:
1) Presupposition of the truth of the Ontological Argument
2) Presupposition of Real Distinction
3) Presupposition of Equivocal Being qua Analogy
For the time being, we will limit ourself to the first presupposition: the truth of the ontological argument. After Finitude asks us “How does Descartes justify the thesis of the absolute existence of extended substance - and hence the non-correlational reach of the mathematical discourse about bodies?”(5) And we are rapidly supplied with an answer: “the nub of the Cartesian argument lies in the idea that the notion of a non-existent god is inherently contradictory. For Descartes, to think God as non-existent is to think a predicate that contradicts its subject, like a triangle that does not have three angles.”(6) So in conclusion, we are assured that “Descartes has provided us with the first glimpses of a “possible access to an absolute reality - A Great Outdoors that is not a correlate of my thought.” (7)
So is this really the “nub” of the Cartesian ontological argument? Is it that easy? On one level, perhaps, if we stick to the argument constructed by Descartes in his fifth meditation. But what about its ground, or the presuppositions upon which it rests? In this case it’s better to survey Descartes’ casual argument in the third mediation. After Finitude seems gives us somewhat sketchy details on both. In reality there exists a somewhat complex nexus of Cartesian principles and proofs which form the basis of his logical judgements. But the noologist would like to begin a bit further back.
Although it was Kant who first coined the term “Ontological Proof,” its first formalizations began as early as the eleventh century, under the auspices of St. Anselm of Canterbury. Using a form of logical deduction later to be known as “modal logic,” St. Anselm set out to demonstrate that a non-necessary existence of God (beyond the idea of God) leads to an absurdity, or contradiction. St. Anslem’s argument, posing God in decidedly realist terms, was soon to suffer a “critique so devastating that the ontological argument died out for several centuries.” (8) The critique came at the hands of St. Thomas Aquinas, and it kept any medieval scholastic attempt at speculative realism at bay for centuries. When Descartes picked it up, in fact, it came as a surprise to many of his contemporaries. But the times were ripe, in the wake of the 30 years war and the scientific revolutions well under way.
But let’s take a look at St. Anselm’s argument: prove the real and necessary existence of God qua the logical method of reductio ad absurdum, reduction to absurdity. Demonstrate that God’s not being necessary and real is a contradiction. How does the modal demonstration function? Assume the opposite of your conclusion (that God doesn’t exist necessarily) explicate it, and demonstrate that it leads to an absurdity. But in order to do so, St. Anselm needs to begin with a definition of God, as he will need to begin his deduction from within the attribute of thought: the idea of God. As an idea represents something, this something must be represented through a definition. God will thus be defined by St. Anselm as that which “nothing greater can be conceived,” “maximal perfection” and the “greatest possible being.” The idea of God, for St. Anselm, represents this objective reality.
From here we need to examine the basic structure of alethic, or modal logic. Modal logic deals with essence and accident and their logical connection with potential and time. We recognize it through the propositions of possibility, contingency, necessity. Often called the “ontology of possibility,” in modal logic first order, intensional logic (value) is expanded to cover quantifiers over individuals (extensions). Intensional qualities, such as possibility and necessity are extended to extensional elements in order to determine their truth value. The event-based notion of “possible worlds” or “universes” is often employed in order to qualify its judgements (Leibniz will later take to notion of possible worlds to dizzying logical heights). Whether such possible worlds actually exist, potentially exist, or are simply convenient logical constructions for the purposes of the judgement of predicates is beyond the scope of our purposes here. What interests us is St. Anselm’s use of modal logic in demonstrating that God necessarily (really) exists departing from the idea of God.
Possibility is considered to be a non-truthful functional operator. Something which is possible is non-contradictory without being true. Possibility may be considered to be a median point between necessity and contingency. A possible propositions is a proposition which must hold true in at least one possible world. “Mikhail Gorbaciov was not president of the Soviet Union.” This proposition, according to modal logic, is considered possible. It is not contradictory, and is therefore true in at least one possible world. Possibility holds to the law that for every proposition that is non-contradictory, there exists a possible world in which such a proposition is true. A necessary proposition, on the other hand, holds true for all possible worlds. Necessity implies identity, or containment. Geometrical truths, for example, are considered necessary truths in that they must be true in all possible worlds. They are truthful functional operators. 4+5=9 is true in all possible worlds. Contingent propositions are defined as being true in some possible worlds and false in others. The determination of a contingent proposition goes beyond its logical formalization: its being true (or false) depends entirely on actuality and states of affairs: “tomorrow is friday and Mikhail Gorbaciov will go to the lake.” A contingent proposition.
And so we arrive at the ontological argument as formulated by St. Anselm:
“If therefore that than which nothing greater can be conceived exists in the understanding alone [and not in Reality], then this thing than which nothing greater can be conceived is something than that which a greater can be conceived. And this is clearly impossible. Therefore, there can be no doubt at all that something than which a greater cannot be conceived exists in both the understanding and in reality.” (8)
Broken down into its logical structure:
1). God is the understanding, or Idea in which nothing greater is possible
2). It is at least possible for God to exist in reality/extension (for every predicate which is non-contradictory there exists at least a possible world in which it is true).
3). If something exists only in the mind (and not in reality/extension) but possibily exists in reality/extension, that something would be greater than it is (as existing only in the mind).
4). Suppose that: God exists only in the mind and not in reality/extension.
5). This supposition implies the existence of a possible being that is greater than God existing only in mind - namely, a God existing in reality/extension.
6). It would therefore be possible for something to exist which is greater than God.
7). As God is that which nothing greater is possible, it would be possible for there to be something greater than God (contradiction).
And in its formalization as a proof:
1). If God exists, then he Necessarily exists (in all possible worlds).
2). It is at least possible for God to exist.
3). God necessarily exists, exists in Reality.
Note that St. Anselm’s argument hinges on two critical points: a real distinction between thought and reality (existence), and the definition of God as that of which nothing can be greater. The definition that St. Anselm attributes to God gives him the means to interpret reality in terms of degrees of perfection, and the real distinction between thought and existence gives him the means to bring his idea of God qua quantification to a logical deduction of possessing reality and hence existence beyond thought. In modal terms, God’s real existence begins as a possibility, and as the existence of God in thought alone leads to a contradiction, a God existing both in thought and reality is concluded to be greater and thus logical consistent. God must therefore exist in thought and in reality, for anything less would be a contradiction in the idea of God.
The noologist isn’t particularily interested in highlighting the contradictions inherent to St. Anselm’s line of argumentation. St. Thomas Aquinas did a far better job at that. What interests the noologist is the rhythm that lies underneath, the quantification of reality into degrees under the equivocal chain on being in which substance is interpretated and hierarchized through real distinction: thought and existence, or thought and extension. Two really distinct attributes of substance. The idea comes first, which scales the ladder of being (through degrees of reality) in order to attribute real existence to God.
As noted, St. Anselm’s proof will soon be attacked. St. Thomas Aquinas’ refutation of the ontological argument will hinge on two essential points: the circularity of the argument, or the fact that it sets out to prove what it presupposes (inherently a critique of the reductio ad absurdum argument applied to the nature of God) and the unjustifiable proposition that “there exists outside the mind something greater than which nothing can be conceived.” (9) Aquinas, in other words, rejects the proposition that thought is inherently limited in regards to reality. For several centuries the ontological argument laid dormant.
Descartes, however, picks us where St. Anselm left off. Although Descartes claims to have known little of St. Anselm or his version of the ontological argument, there are undoubtedly points of intersection and Descartes clearly takes great steps to avoid the criticisms suffered by St. Anselm. Descartes will bring many innovations to the proof, not the least of which a fully mechanistic view of extension. Descartes, in many ways, through the cogito, innate idea, and clear and distinct perception institutes a quasi-complete rupture with antiquity, constructed along the way a new image of thought centered on doubt, error, and the “I” determined as “a thinking thing.” Descartes initiates the era of rationalism, based on geometric proofs, methods, and demonstrations. But despite the numerous scientific and metaphysical innovations, Descartes will share more in common with St. Anselm, at least more than he’d like to admit. Descartes, in demonstrating the real existence of God, like St. Anselm, will have to begin with the representational idea of God, and the definition of God as the most perfect being. Descartes will follow the same path, albeit in a much more refined manner in making his passes towards speculative realism.
For Descartes, however, reformulating the ontological argument was simply not enough: Descartes will make a decisive structural break with scholastic logic itself and usher in a new era of intuitive, more purely intensional logic. Medieval scholastic logic often emphasized the method known as genus-differentia, the process through which intensional definitions, or groups/specie (genus) are subdivided through the operation of difference. For Descartes, logic must be concise, intuitive, and geometric. The proposition that the triangle contains three angles is immediate and necessary truth, what is implied by a concept must necessarily be true as well. The Cartesian innate idea and clear and distinct perception will relegate the reductio ad absurdum to irrelevance. Truth is granted simultaneity with thought, and this will be a decisive break from platonism, grounded on truth as being anterior to both thought and existence. Intuition will henceforth be the primary instrument of logic.
For Descartes, innate ideas are "either in our understanding, or they are our understanding itself." (10) Similar to Plato’s reminiscence, yet no longer anterior, the innate idea can be seen as inherent to the structure of thought itself. The innate idea is coextensive with thought, yet must be discovered. We must discover the true and innate ideas which exists contemporaneously within thought, uncover something already present. For Descartes, learning geometry is to uncover the objective structure of thought. Now we must keep in mind the importance of the notion of “objective structure” which resides innately within thought, which will be of essential importance for Descartes in bridging thought to the world of extension.
From the innate idea Descartes moves on to the clear and distinct perception, which by nature excludes from perception any empirical or sense related perception. Descartes has deducted that his body, extension, the empirical or sensible cannot yield certainty for metaphysical speculation. Clear and distinct perception stems from necessary truths, truths of essence, truths of the idea. In a clear and distinct perception, something is grasped immediately, by way of containment. Consider a geometrical truth: a triangle is a closed planar figure consisting of three sides. I can perceive the triangle intuitively, for I can immediately grasp the three concepts that are contained in the triangle: planar figure, closed, three sides. A clear and distinct perception is immediate, and inherently necessary, true in all worlds. A clear and distinct perception is a truth of identity, later to be known as an analytical truth.
In Descartes’ Meditations, the definitive ontological argument is widely considered to be the argument set forth in the fifth meditation. In it, Descartes’ sense of intensional intuition creates a surprisingly brief and cogent argument employing both the concept of the innate idea and clear and distinct percept. It is also widely considered, however, that the ground or framework of the proof rests upon the so-called “casual argument” set forth in the third meditation. In fact, in order to Descartes to be understood within public circles he begrudgingly forulated several heuristic formalizations of the proof which rely on several key notions developed in the third meditation. Now here’s the proof as set forth in the fifth meditation:
"…from the very fact that I can derive from my thoughts the idea of something, it follows that all that I clearly and distinctly recognize as characteristic of this thing does in reality characterize it…It is certain that I find in my mind the idea of God, of a supremely perfect being…and I recognize that an actual and eternal existence belongs to his nature." (11)
The brevity and certainty of Descartes here is striking. It possesses an analytical and assured rhythm: necessary existence is contained within the idea of a supremely perfect being, the idea of a supremely perfect being is innate. As simple as that. Now let’s take a look at two different formalizations of the proof:
Syllogistic Formalization:
1). Whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive to be contained in the idea of something is true of that thing.
2). I clearly and distinctly perceive that necessary existence is contained in the Idea of God.
3). Therefore, God exists.
Hueristic Formalization:
1). I have an idea of supremely perfect being, a being having all perfections.
2). Necessary existence is a perfection.
3). Therefore, a supremely perfect being exists.
The heuristic formalization, conceived of mainly for use in correspondences and discussions with contemporaries echoes much of what St. Anselm had set forth to demonstrate centuries before: idea of an absolute, absolute as perfection, etc. And it is this definition which brings us to the casual proof in the third meditation. So let’s take a look at the corollary proof in the third meditation, which turns out to be somewhat more substantial:
"When mind…discovers the idea of a Being who is omniscient, omnipotent and absolutely perfect…in it it recognizes not merely a possible and contingent existence, as in all other ideas it has of things,…but one that is absolutely necessary and eternal…from the fact that it perceives that necessary and eternal existence is comprised in the idea it has of an absolutely perfect being, it has clearly to conclude that this absolutely perfect being exists." (12)
Here with discover, as was the case with St. Anselm, a fairly significant use of modal logic is grafted onto to the more intentional cogency of the innate idea and clear and distinct perception. Let’s break down the formal structure:
1). The mind possesses innately the Idea of God. God is represented in the Idea as the most perfect being, infinite, omniscient etc. (representation of God)
2). Ideas must be caused by something containing the essence of the Idea within it. (eminent causation as overcoming possibility, contingency).
3). The Idea of God as perfect being must therefore be caused by something containing perfection. (eminent causality)
4). Being finite and imperfect, I (or my faculty of thought) cannot be the cause of this Idea of God. (the cogito, doubt)
5). Therefore, there must exist a being which contains the properties of a most perfect being. (necessary existence)
6). As God is defined as the most perfect being, and a most perfect being must necessarily exist, God must, logically and necessarily, exist.
Careful to ward off the criticism inherent to the empiricism of St. Thomas Aquinas, Descartes begins with the idea of God (the representation of perfectly) simultaneously with the innate idea. Descartes has therefore created for himself a logical grounding which St. Anselm lacked. (being as determined by thinking, “cogito ergo sum.” And although Descartes, as did St. Anselm, will qualify his chain of being through a quantification via degrees of reality, he will ground his deduction through a reformulated conception of efficient causation: eminent causality. So let’s take a brief look into the structure of Cartesian eminent causality. We will first have to examine the framework of Descartes’ substance theory, with its notable Aristotelian overtones. For Descartes, the “world” undergoes an initial distinction or division: infinite substance (God) and finite substance (that which is emanated from God). Finite substance, in turn, undergoes a second distinction (the so-called real distinction): res cogitans, thinking substance, expressed through the attribute of thought, and res extensa, expressed through the attribute of extension, or bodies. God is defined as infinite in that it depends on absolutely nothing for its existence (that which contains, or emanates everything), and therefore any finite substance is defined for its dependencies and causes. A concrete entity is the attributes of thought and extension is called a mode. An idea, for example, is a mode of the attribute of thought, just as a stone is a mode of the attribute of extension. It is, of course, fundamental to understand that for Descartes, the attribute of thought and extension belong only to finite substances, and are irreducible to one another: they possess separate beings (hence Descartes’ infamous mind-body causal problems). Being, for Descartes, is thus based on a real distinction, and is inherently equivocal, operating through analogy (but more on that a bit later on). Any finite substance is a created substance, and Descartes will choose thought as his starting point as extension is claimed to be, in itself, inaccessible to clear and distinct perception, unless filtered through the indivisible attribute of thought.
All finite substance therefore has causes, affections. Descartes cannot doubt that he is not doubting, he grounds his speculative realism in the res cogitans. At this point, he needs to uncover the cause of his innate idea of God. As an idea exists in finite substance as a mode in the attribute of thought, it, as a mode, must have a cause. Reality is quantified in terms of degrees of perfection: beginning with the most perfect, God and descending through finite substances through attributes to the bottom of the scale, or pyramid: the modes. A mode generally possesses a low degree of reality.
But, and this is a big but, at this point we have to consider yet another distinction made by Descartes regarding the being of an idea, which is essential to his conception of eminent causality. This is the dual being of the idea itself, or its intrinsic and extrinsic nature, a notion which is common throughout rationalism. An idea for Descartes has two realities: its intrinsic reality (or its concrete formal qualities as a mode of the attribute of thought, what it actually is) and its extrinsic reality, what it represents (which may in turn be an entity in the attribute of thought or in the attribute of extension). These two attributes of the idea are commonly known as its formal reality and objective reality. Both are key to Descartes’ notion of speculative realism, as they are the logical means in which the simple idea will obtain infinite substance and hence an absolute beyond the reach of thought itself.
Keeping this dual being of the idea in mind, we are ready to consider Descartes’s casual adequacy principle: something must be caused by something with at least the same degree of reality or a higher degree of reality. Something which contains it, either in an equal or superior degree. A tree branch must be caused by or another tree branch or by a tree, not by an idea nor by a color. Straightforward. But Descartes does not set out from strictly from either extension alone or thought alone, he begins with an idea which has an intrinsic (formal) and extrinsic (objective) qualities. A simple casual adequacy principle will therefore not suffice, and will be further developed: whatever is contained objectively in an idea must be contained either formally or eminently in the cause of that idea.
The definitive formulation of Descartes causal adequacy principle: an idea must be caused by something which has as much formal reality as the idea has objective reality. Things seem to get complicated, so let’s look over some of its basic premises. Now we know that the objective reality of an idea is what it represents as representation. The idea of the sun, for example, contains the reality of the sun objectively, as representation. Now, the formal reality of the idea of the sun is just that: its being as a mode in the attribute of thought. The idea of the sun, therefore, has the formality reality of a mode in the attribute of thought, and the objective reality of representing a finite substance, the sun. The sun itself, however, as an entity of extension, has only a formal reality, that of being a finite substance. Let’s consider, in this light, eminent containment or causality: a reality is contained in something eminently when it is contained within something of a higher form of reality such that: (1) the thing does not possess that reality formally, but (2) it has the ability to cause that reality formally in something else. God, for example, as infinite substance, is neither a thinking thing nor an extended substance, he is the cause of both as he eminently contains both. Back to our idea of the sun: it must be caused by something that contains as much formal reality as the idea of the sun contains objective reality.
Ideas all possess the same formal reality: that of being modes in the attribute of thought. The objective reality of ideas, however, vary. The idea of a tree, for example, possesses a greater degree of reality than the idea of fear or the idea of color, as it represents a finite substance. The idea of God, in turn, possess a greater degree of reality or perfection. The idea of God, the idea of the tree and the idea of fear all possess the same degree of formal reality or perfection. Each, however, possesses a varying degree of objective perfection: infinite substance, finite substance in the attribute of extension, mode in the attribute of thought. We therefore have a means of determining hierarchically the causes of these three ideas. What this boils down to, for Descartes, is that ultimately, while an idea may be the cause of another idea (the idea of god may be the cause of the idea of a tree which in turn may be the cause of the idea of fear or of a color), the efficient cause of an idea must eminently be something greater than an idea something with more objective reality (all ideas possess the same formal degree of reality). Let’s go back to the example of the tree branch. The idea of the tree branch cannot be the cause of the tree branch as it possess a lower degree of formal reality. It must have therefore been caused by the entity of the true, in that it possesses the same formal reality as the tree branch as finite substance, or it may ultimately be caused by God, which, as perfection, has a higher degree of formal reality.
Following his casual adequacy principle, Descartes can trace the causes of his idea of God to the absolute of infinite substance: there thus exists a cause of his idea of absolute perfection which is beyond his idea of absolute perfection. In other words, God has as much formal reality as the idea of God has objective reality. An an idea must have as its eminent cause something which has as much formal reality as my idea has objective reality, I cannot ultimately be the cause of my idea of God. The cogito thus stands alone before the great outdoors: a formally perfectly being outside of my faculty of thought which is its cause.
In light of the framework set forth in the casual argument of the third meditation, the proof of the fifth meditation obtains its immediacy and concision: as I clearly an distinctly perceive necessary existence in the idea of God (argument from the third meditation), therefore he necessarily exists. The non-correlationist has individuated an image of thought which is to serve as model: “in short, it is Descartes who ratifies the idea that nature is devoid of thought (which is to say devoid of life, since the two are equivalent for him), and that thought is able to think this de-subjectified nature through mathematics”). (13)
So how does After Finitude present the Cartesian proof to us? At first glance, we are given a somewhat reduced form of it: “[the ontological proof] proceeds by inferring God’s existence from his definition as an infinitely perfect being - since He is posited as perfect, and since existence is a perfection, God cannot but exist. Since he conceives of God as existing necessarily, whether I exist to think of Him or not, Descartes assures me of a possible reality - a Great Outdoors that is not a correlate of my thought.” (14)
The non-correlationist praises Descartes have having discovered the existence of an absolute, perfect God, what the non-correlationist will call a “primary absolute.” The clear and distinct perception, in turn, will be called a “derivative absolute,” as mathematics sets the groundwork for “absolute reach” - “any aspect of a body that can exist mathematically (whether though arithmetic or geometry) can exist absolutely outside of me.” (15) The non-correlationist does not invent, he discovers. The non-correlationist, of course, will modify many of the basic terms an tenets of the Cartesian proof, yet admits that he must “strive to provide an argument of the same structure.” (17) The Cartesian cogito, of course, the conceptual persona of Descartes, will undergo change as well.
For the time present, the subsequent refutations of “correlationist” critiques of the Cartesian proof are of little interest to the noologist (for he is interested not so much in locating contradicitions in refutations but rather the structure of the proof itself). When possible, the noologist avoids critique through negation.
They will no doubt be taken up in successive steps. For now, the noologist would like to highlight four key points deduced in examining the Cartesian proofs:
-the role of the innate idea
-the role of the definition of God in the determination of the deduction of God’s absolute and necessary existence.
-the role of the casual adequacy principle, or eminent causality as efficient causality
-the dual being of the idea (its formal and objective reality) and its presupposition of the representational being of the idea.
These will be the noologist’s cardinal points in forthcoming examinations of the roles of real distinction and equivocal analaogy and their positioning within the non-correlationist image of thought: it’s axiomatic infrastructure.
